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Abstract: Empirical examination of individual-level survey data on national 
identity, in general, reveals a significant relationship between religious 
affiliation and an individual's international-policy preferences and that this 
relationship varies across Protestant denominations. Specifically, we test 
attitudes toward import and immigration policies, the role of international 
institutions, and unilateral policy actions. The empirical results indicate that 
individuals affiliated with conservative Protestant denominations are more 
likely to support positions on international issues that can be regarded as 
consistent with the anti-globalist right. We also find evidence of a reinforcing 
regional effect among conservatives in the south, and differences in the 
preferences of Baptist and non-Baptist African Americans. 
Keywords: Religion, international policy preferences, survey data, trade 
policy, immigration policy 
Since Max Weber's (1958) study of the Protestant ethic, 
scholars from a wide variety of academic disciplines have debated the 
effects of religion on a nation's economic performance. Recently there 
has been a rekindling of interest among economists on the role of 
religion in shaping individual traits, attitudes toward economic policies, 
and the resulting effects on potential economic prosperity. Iannaccone 
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(1998, p. 1465), in his survey of the literature on economics and 
religion, argues that the study of religion represents “new territory” in 
the field of economics, while Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002, p. 
2) assert that “the importance of religion in explaining the prosperity 
of nations seems to be experiencing a rebirth.” In a similar manner, 
Dark (2000), foresaw increasing attention being paid to religion in the 
field of global economic relations. In contrast, Philpott (2002, p. 67) 
maintains that up until the events of September 11, most political-
economy scholars have long assumed that religion is not among the 
factors that influence states' actions in the global arena. 
 
It is well documented that religious participation in the United 
States greatly exceeds that of other advanced economies.1 Religious 
denominations in the United States, as non-state actors, have the will 
and assets to initiate and affect political action and, based on their 
particular beliefs, have specific preferences on issues such as abortion 
and same-sex marriage and lobby actively to shape policies on these 
issues. Though less evident on the world stage, religious 
denominations and organizations have demonstrated effectiveness in 
shaping international policy actions. A recent example is the successful 
drive for debt relief of the poorest nations. Naming the effort after the 
Jubilee concept of the Old Testament (Leviticus, in which slaves are 
freed and landed property is periodically returned to the original 
owner) enabled the building of a broad coalition of faiths. This 
coalition, in turn, facilitated a highly visible and sustained public 
pressure campaign.2 
 
Another trend in religious participation in the United States is 
the surge in the membership of conservative Protestant churches and 
the decline in membership of more moderate denominations. 
According to Coreno (2002), most sociologists and historians believe 
that the growth of fundamentalism is a reaction to the consequences 
of modernization and the secularization of religious practices. In an 
attempt to defend American culture from encroaching secularism, 
individuals form small but interconnected denominations and enclave 
communities, thereby separating themselves from mainstream 
churches and a secular world. 
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Over the past few decades the process of globalization has 
fostered ever increasing social interaction and socioeconomic change. 
Held et al. (1999) claim that many people see the sheer scale of 
contemporary social and economic change brought about by 
globalization as beyond the capacity of national governments and 
individuals to control or resist. According to Little (2003, p. ix), one 
view is that the negative consequences of globalization result from a 
marginalization of the labor movement and, therefore, a lack of a 
counterbalance to the “crueler aspects of corporate capitalism.” One 
would suspect, therefore, that individuals affiliated with denominations 
whose origins were to defend traditionalism and resist change would 
have specific views toward globalization and international issues. 
Consider, for example, a representative statement of the United 
Methodist Church (2003):  
 
The global community cannot remain passive spectators of the 
relentless march of a globalizing economic system which allows 
a few unaccountable economic and financial actors to wield 
excessive power at the expense of the vast majority of the 
world's peoples. 
 
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2002) statement on 
international trade maintains that:  
 
Trade liberalization is designed to open markets and increase 
general economic welfare by promoting efficiency of production 
and hence increasing the availability and reducing the cost of 
goods and services. However, trade liberalization, while it may 
produce job gains in some areas, can produce job losses and 
family and community dislocation in other areas and can also 
lead to environmental degradation. There is also a growing 
concern that trade rules may unduly benefit investors in some 
countries to the detriment of workers and the economies of 
poorer countries creating a widening gap between rich and poor. 
Coupled with growing international financial instability, trade 
has moved from being considered a technical matter to a 
political one. 
 
Coalitions of religious adherents in the United States have 
demonstrated the ability to influence national elections, as seen in the 
last Republican primary (see Reichley, 2002). They also wield 
enormous economic power as collective shareholders and thereby the 
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ability to shape corporate governance structures and auditing of social 
responsibility. The international relations literature continues to 
develop models of how collective preferences of societal actors result 
in state policy outcomes, and offers much promise in understanding 
how growing religious participation and evangelicalism may constrain 
international economic policymaking. (See, for example, Bearce, 2003 
for a review of the theory and evidence of how societal preferences 
affect monetary policy outcomes.) Of equal interest is the question of 
how the beliefs of various denominations are translated into social 
preferences of their adherents (see, for example, Johnston, 2001). It 
is also important, however, to first determine if individuals affiliated 
with various denominations have identifiable global-policy preferences, 
and if so, what these preferences might be. 
 
Of course there are numerous empirical studies on the link 
between religious affiliation and individual attitudes toward social and 
economic policies. Nonetheless, the body of empirical evidence 
provides mixed results on the link between religious orthodoxy and 
economic and political conservatism. These studies, however, focus on 
domestic social policies such as domestic income inequality, income 
redistribution, and welfare programs. There is also a substantial body 
of research on individual attitudes toward international economic 
policies, the most recent of which focus on two common theories or 
models of international trade policy preferences—the Ricardo-Viner (R-
V) model and the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. Both theories consider 
the effect of increased trade on input factors' returns and provide a 
framework to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of opening 
trade on their income. (See Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a and 2001b, 
for a survey of this literature.) 
 
The different outcomes of these competing models can be 
illustrated as follows: If we assume that the United States is relatively 
abundant with high-skilled labor, the H-O model predicts that high-
skilled workers in the U.S. would support free trade while low-skilled 
workers would not. According to the R-V model, workers employed in 
comparative advantage sectors would support free trade, while those 
employed in comparative disadvantage sectors would not. Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001a and 2001b) employ individual-level survey data for 
the United States to identify if individual skill level or factor type is a 
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significant determinant of trade-policy preferences. The authors find 
that factor type rather than sector of employment influences trade 
policy preferences. Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003) directly extend 
the analysis of Scheve and Slaughter to ten advanced economies. 
Using both education and relative earnings as alternative measure of 
individual skill level, they find that skill is a robust determinant of 
individual preferences on immigration policies. In two additional and 
broader cross-country working papers, Mayda and Rodrik (2001) apply 
ordered estimation techniques to explain attitudes toward trade and 
immigration and find support for the factor endowment model. 
 
What is yet to be given systematic study, however, is the link 
between religious affiliation and attitudes toward global policies. Gay 
(1991) is one of the few exceptions to this, and yet his assessment of 
the evangelical debate over capitalism is based on statements by 
“intellectuals” and admittedly not rank and file members. Focusing on 
statements of organizational leaders has led some scholars to dismiss 
the possibility of a link between religious affiliation and attitudes on 
international policies. This position rules out the possibility that the 
main commodities of religious denominations, religious beliefs, affect 
individual attitudes and in turn manifest themselves in international 
policy preferences that are not necessarily consistent with the views of 
an organization's Bishops or leading intellectuals. In contrast, we 
follow the most recent literature which focuses less on the causal 
relationship between religion and economic attitudes and on the 
transformative potential of religion. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2002) provide a survey of this theoretical literature on the causal link 
and conclude that religious beliefs are low frequency variables—based 
on religious teachings and conditioned by the cultural environment of 
the religion—that affect adherents' attitudes toward the economic 
system and do not necessarily reflect literal messages found in sacred 
texts or in statements by religious leaders. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between 
religious affiliation and individual preferences toward specific 
international policies. Implicitly we follow the approach of Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales toward the relationship between religion and 
economic attitudes. Also, we are similar to Milner's (1988) approach to 
understanding protectionist attitudes: We do not account for 
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international policy outcomes, and we do not contend that we have 
fully explained individual international-policy preferences. Rather, we 
argue that the impact of an individual's religious affiliation plays an 
important and understudied role in shaping individual international-
policy preferences. Specifically, our hypotheses are: (1) There is a 
significant relationship between an individual's religious affiliation and 
their international-policy preferences. (2) Because the United States is 
a multi-denominational society, the relationship between affiliation and 
policy preferences varies across denominations. (3) Conservative 
Protestants, especially those in the southern region of the United 
States, maintain a stronger commitment to separatism (as argued by 
Coreno, p. 338) and, therefore, are more likely to display anti-globalist 
policy preferences. 
 
To explore these hypotheses, we examine International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) data on national identity and augment it with 
the General Social Survey (GSS) data to obtain the individual 
respondent's religious affiliation. Our four empirical models employ 
survey questions on imports, immigration, the role of international 
institutions, and unilateral policy actions. Our results, in general, show 
that religious affiliation is indeed a significant determinant of 
international policy preferences and that individuals affiliated with 
conservative Protestant denominations are more likely to support 
positions on international issues that can be regarded as consistent 
with the nationalist-protectionist right. That is, they are more likely to 
agree with polices that restrict imports and reduce immigration, more 
likely to oppose granting enforcement rights to international 
institutions, and more likely to agree with unilateral policy actions. We 
also find, however, that individuals affiliated with the United Methodist 
Church—the third largest religious organization in the United States 
and one typically considered liberal to moderate in its theological 
orthodoxy—also are more likely to support policies that restrict 
imports. In addition, we find evidence of a reinforcing regional effect 
and differences between African American Baptists and non-Baptist 
African Americans on the issues of imports, and granting enforcement 
rights to international institutions. In total we take this as evidence of 
a relationship between an individual's religious affiliation and their 
preferences toward international policies, suggesting that religious-
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based social teaching may indeed affect individual views on global 
economic issues. 
 
In the next section we summarize the literature on religious 
participation and economic and political attitudes. In that section we 
also outline the literature on the conservative to liberal continuum of 
Protestant denominations. Next we describe the survey data used in 
our empirical analysis. The following section provides the results of the 
analysis and a conclusion is then offered. 
The Link Between Religious Affiliation And 
Economic And Political Attitudes 
In an extensive survey, Iannaccone (1998) separates studies of 
economics and religion into three categories. The first line of research 
deals with the micro-foundations of religious participation, the second 
addresses the economic consequences or outcomes of religious 
participation, while the third line of research invokes religious 
teachings to critique economic policies. This study is in keeping with 
the second area of research and, for space considerations, the reader 
is otherwise referred to Iannaccone. This section briefly outlines some 
of the important contributions on the link between religious 
participation, theological orthodoxy and economic conservatism, and 
individual attitudes toward international economic policies. 
A. Religious Participation and Economic Outcomes 
There are a number of prominent empirical studies of the 
consequences of religious affiliation. Lowry (1998), for example, 
considers religious participation and the individual's choice of 
membership in environmental groups. The premise is that religious 
affiliation is a measure of an individual's beliefs about “the good 
society” and is therefore reflected in the specific policies the affiliation 
espouses. Lowery also argues that the strength of an individual's 
religious affiliation may, in turn, affect the degree of their policy 
convictions. Testing state-level data, he finds that the number of 
members of Judeo-Christian denominations per household has a 
negative and significant effect on membership rates to groups 
advocating public policies in favor of environmental preservation. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Interactions, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2005): pg. 273-301. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
8 
 
Further, his results suggest that religious affiliation positively affects 
membership to sportsmen groups advocating private stewardship of 
natural resources. 
 
Glaeser and Glendon (1998) test Max Weber's view that—
because of the Calvinism dogma of predestination versus Catholicism 
dogma of free will—economic growth of Protestant nations exceeds 
that of Catholic nations. They find that, on average, Protestant 
religious beliefs are conducive to higher per capita income and growth 
after controlling for individual characteristics such as health status, 
age, gender, education, income, and perceived social status, as well as 
country fixed effects. Barro and McCleary (2003) find that economic 
growth responds positively to enhanced religious beliefs, but 
negatively to increased participation, even while controlling for 
possible reverse causation. In a similar manner, Mehanna (2003) finds 
that countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more 
open, in terms of trade, than Catholic or Muslim nations. 
 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002) examine the impact of 
religion on attitudes toward several issues including trust of 
government, women working, and thriftiness. They find that religious 
beliefs are associated with “good” economic attitudes and that 
religious effects differ across major religious denominations. Dahl and 
Ransom (1999) consider the importance of the strength of religious 
affiliation—or religiosity—in the presence of economic self-interest by 
surveying members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
on tithing beliefs. Their premise is that devout members, defined by 
church attendance, are less likely to allow financial self-interest to 
affect their definition of income for tithing purposes. While they find a 
pattern that more frequent churchgoers appear less self-serving than 
infrequent churchgoers, their likelihood ratio statistics are insignificant. 
B. Theological Orthodoxy and Economic Conservatism 
There are numerous empirical studies on the link between 
religious conservatism and economic and political conservatism. As 
discussed and summarized by Pyle (1993), groups such as the Moral 
Majority reinforce a public perception that Christian conservatism is 
tied to conservative political and economic attitudes. The assumption 
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is that, on the one hand, individuals affiliated with conservative 
denominations are opposed to progressive government expenditure 
programs designed to reduce social inequality. On the other hand, 
individuals affiliated with liberal denominations are more accepting of 
such programs. 
 
A common hypothesis underlying this opinion is that 
conservatives tend to believe that social change should come about 
through the conversion of the individual as opposed to reform of 
economic and social policies. Pyle concludes that there is little 
consensus on the issue, yet argues that social class, race, and political 
ideology take precedent over religious orientation, but once controlling 
for these factors, religious affiliation still matters and theological 
conservatism is likely related to conservative attitudes toward 
government assistance programs. His analysis, however, finds the 
opposite in that theological liberalism is less likely to predict support 
government restructuring programs. His results are not unique as a 
number of other studies (see Iannaccone, 1993 for example) which 
found that adherents of conservative denominations are more likely to 
support government support policies. 
 
Specific to this study, there is the additional difficulty of 
associating international policy preferences with liberal or conservative 
political ideologies. As argued by Giddens (1994), the left–right 
political ideology distinction may not retain any meaning when applied 
to anything outside of conventional political issues, such as 
globalization. Even so, Steger (2001) argues that there remain 
significant differences between the anti-globalists on the left and right 
to differentiate between the two, branding the conservative anti-
globalist camp as the nationalist-protectionists 
 
Coreno (2002) argues that in order to defend radical 
traditionalism against the penetration of secular values; conservative 
Protestants often form small, interconnected—yet independent—
enclave communities. By forming enclave communities they are able 
to separate themselves, as much as possible, from the encroachment 
of secular change. Barro and McCleary also theorize that religion may 
influence the propensity to interact with outsiders in domestic or 
international business and, therefore, affect a country's degree of 
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openness. Hence, we hypothesize that conservative Protestants are 
more likely to display nationalist-protectionist attitudes such as 
favoring policies that restrict imports and immigration, supporting 
unilateral policy actions, and opposing rights being granted to 
international organizations. 
Survey Data 
In order to examine the relationship between affiliation and 
international-policy issues, we employ the results of a survey 
conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für Empirische 
Sozialforschung as part of the International Social Survey Program. 
The survey is titled ISSP: National Identity and available through the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).3 
We augment this data with the General Social Survey (GSS) 
component which divides the main Protestant religions into twenty-
eight sub-denominations. In this section we describe the dependent 
and independent variables used in the analysis and the treatment of 
missing observations.  
A. Missing Data 
Our first difficulty lies in addressing the problem of missing 
values, a common problem in empirical treatments of survey data. 
(The number of missing values for the data used here can be found in 
Tables 1 and 2.) There are basically two approaches to handling 
missingness. The first approach is to omit the cases with missing 
values via listwise deletion. Listwise deletion, however, may result in 
biased estimates if the deleted cases systematically differ from the 
observed cases, and also reduces the efficiency of estimates because 
important information is lost.  
 
The most common alternative to listwise deletion is to impute 
values for missing data. This approach does not assume that the 
missing data is missing at random as does listwise deletion, rather it 
generates correct uncertainty estimates conditional on the data used 
to impute missing values. To generate data sets with imputed values 
for missing data we use the EMis algorithm of Amelia: A Program for 
Missing Data, by Honaker et al. (2000). The reader is referred to King 
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et al. (2001) for a detailed description of the advantages of this 
approach and the EMis algorithm. 
 
The process of imputing values involves three steps. The first 
step is to generate multiple data sets containing imputed values for 
missing data. Based on the size of our data set and following King et 
al. (2001), we generate five data sets that are used for all applications 
in this study. The second step is to estimate a regression model for all 
of the imputed data sets, thereby creating multiple coefficient 
estimates. The final step is to combine the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors. 
B. Description of the Dependent Variables 
Responses for the following survey items are the dependent variables 
of our analysis. The survey items are:  
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to 
protect its national economy. 
2. How much do you agree with the following: For certain problems like 
environment pollution, international bodies (e.g., the United Nations, 
European Union, World Health Organization) should have the right to 
enforce solutions. 
3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
United States should follow its own interest, even if this leads to 
conflicts with other nations. 
4. Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays 
should be …  
For the first three items individuals could select agree strongly, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly, or 
refuse to choose. For the final item, individuals could select increased 
a lot, increased a little, remain the same, reduced a little, reduced a 
lot, or refuse to choose. Table 1 provides the summary data on the 
dependent variables. It is important to note that using policy-oriented 
questions implicitly assumes that the respondent has some 
understanding of the effects of these policy changes on their individual 
welfare. 
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C. Description of the Independent Variables 
Following the literature cited in this study, we control for a 
number of factors that may shape an individual's views on 
international policies. In general, we control for demographics, 
individual skill level, and political ideology, while testing the 
significance of religious affiliation and religiosity. Each variable is 
described below. 
Demographic, Political Ideology, and Skill Level 
Female is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity 
for female and zero for male, and Age is a continuous variable, 
measured in years. The studies discussed above find evidence, though 
not consistently significant, indicating that women are more likely to 
support restrictions on trade. In addition, Kull (1998) reports that 
women are more likely to support international engagement that is 
based on partnership and cooperation as opposed to unilateral action 
policy actions. The evidence on age is mixed. 
 
African American is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 
of unity if the respondent is African American, and zero otherwise. 
Hispanic is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if the 
respondent is Hispanic, and zero otherwise. Though previous studies 
show that race is an important determinant of support for domestic 
social policies, Kull (1998) concludes that race plays a limited role in 
shaping views on international policies. Union indicates if the 
respondent and / or their spouse is a member of a trade union with a 
value of unity, and zero otherwise. Major trade unions in the United 
States have very specific views on negative consequences of 
international trade and, therefore, union members are more likely to 
be opposed to international trade. At the same time, the major trade 
unions are favorable on legal immigration and so we do not expect 
union members to oppose immigration. 
 
Social Class is the respondent's view of their social status and is 
a categorical variable that ranges from 1 for lower class to 5 for upper 
class. We expect that individuals that identify with lower social classes 
are more likely to feel threatened by globalization, specifically trade 
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and immigration. Similar to the studies cited earlier, we model political 
ideology with a categorical variable that ranges from unity, indicating 
someone who views their political ideology as far left, to five, 
indicating someone views their political ideology as far right. 
 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) show that, once controlling for 
political ideology and demographic characteristics, either education or 
earnings are appropriate measures of labor market skills and should 
be included as an economic factor as opposed to a demographic factor. 
Education and earnings, however, should not be included in the same 
model. Because of space consideration and the number of missing 
values that were imputed for earnings (423 for earnings versus 4 for 
education), we use education as a proxy measure of individual skill 
throughout this paper. Nonetheless, in general our results are the 
same for either education or earnings and for including both variables 
at the same time. Hence, our measure of skill level is a continuous 
variable that indicates the number of years of schooling the 
respondent has completed. The demographic, political ideology, and 
skill variables are summarized in Table 2. 
Religious Affiliation 
The survey asked individuals if they belonged to a major 
religious group. There were approximately thirty denominations that 
respondents could identify with including Catholic, Jewish, various 
Protestant denominations, other Christian denominations, and non-
Christian denominations. Individuals were also allowed to select no 
affiliation or to refuse to answer. Only two individuals refused to 
answer and were removed from the sample. (In other words, we did 
not impute missing values for affiliation.) Individuals with no religious 
affiliation serve as the base group for all of our regression analysis. 
There were no responses to categories other than Catholic, Protestant, 
other Christian and Jewish. The distribution of the sample among the 
major denominations is illustrated in Figure 1. In the United States the 
ISSP is administered as part of the GSS. The GSS section of the ISSP 
further breaks down the major Protestant denominations into an 
additional twenty-eight sub-denominations, such as Southern Baptist, 
United Methodist, and so on.  
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The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) sorts these sub-
denominations into a topology of liberal, moderate, or conservative, 
based upon scales of orthodoxy, biblical inerrancy, and denominational 
differences on being born again.4 We shall refer to this particular 
classification system as NORC in our regression analysis. Roof and 
McKinney (1987) provide an alternative classification system (see 
Coreno and Pyle, op. cit., as examples of the application of this 
system), which we shall refer to as RM throughout. The two main 
differences between RM and NORC are: RM focuses on regional 
differences, so that Baptists are divided into those who live in the 
south (Census definition) and those who do not, while NORC focuses 
on sub-denominations, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention is separated 
from the American Baptist Association and so on. Secondly, by 
focusing on denominations, NORC divides the sub-denominations of a 
major denomination across the liberal to conservative continuum. Roof 
and McKinney, in contrast, use a regional approach to divide adherents 
into a continuum of sub-denominations. We augment the NORC 
system by isolating the second and third largest denominations in the 
United States, Southern Baptist and United Methodist respectively, and 
augment the RM system by separating Methodists in the same regional 
manner as Baptists.  
 
Results 
Our objective is to determine if an individual's religious 
affiliation holds any additional insight into their international-policy 
preferences. Our approach, therefore, is to add religious affiliation and 
religiosity to the models of international-policy preferences found most 
recently in the literature, thereby controlling for other important 
individual demographic, economic, and political characteristics. 
 
In our empirical analysis the possible responses to the survey 
questions are modeled as ordered choice models with five possible 
answers as detailed in Table 1. Given that the multiple categories of 
responses to the survey questions follow a natural order, we employ 
ordered probit (OP) estimation techniques. The five imputed data sets 
were used to generate the OP estimates for every model. Following 
Honaker et al., (2000), model coefficients are the mean estimates of 
the five imputed data sets. The standard errors are found by averaging 
the mean standard error across the five data sets, combining this 
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value with the standard error across the five data sets, which is 
adjusted for the fact that the number of observations is less than 
infinity. We, therefore, not only allow for uncertainty of the point 
estimates, but also for the uncertainty of the imputed values. 
A. Base Model Results 
Table 3 provides the results of a base model to facilitate 
comparisons with the literature cited above. The results indicate that 
older respondents, union members, individuals that identify with lower 
social classes, and African Americans are more likely to support 
policies that restrict imports, while higher-skill individuals and 
Hispanics are more likely to disagree. Older individuals and individuals 
who identify their political ideology to the right are more likely to 
disagree with international institutions having enforcement rights. 
Females and higher-skill individuals are more likely to disagree with a 
nation acting unilaterally. Older respondents, individuals who identify 
their political ideology to the right, and individuals who identify with 
lower social classes are more likely to prefer restricting immigration, 
while higher-skill individuals and Hispanics are more likely to favor 
increasing immigration levels.5 
B. Religious Affiliation 
Table 3 also provides results for each model when the major 
religious denominations and a religiosity measure are added. These 
results show that Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, and 
individuals affiliated with denominations that fall into the broad 
category of “other Protestant” are more likely to support policies that 
restrict imports. Lutherans and other Protestants are more likely to 
disagree with international institutions having enforcement rights, 
while Jews and Baptists are more likely to agree with a nation acting 
unilaterally. None of the major denominations are significant in the 
regression on immigration. 
 
In addition to the results described above, the results for African 
Americans (in regard to imports) appear to be sensitive to the 
inclusion of religion controls. We suspect that this reflects the 
possibility that religious affiliations have a differential effect within 
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race. Subsequent regressions attempt to flesh this out through the use 
of cohort groups for African Americans. The results for age also show 
some sensitivity to the additional variables (see the imports and 
institutions models in particular), specifically because of the greater 
religiosity of older respondents.6 Inglehart (1990) suggests that the 
difference in religiosity across age may be due to a cultural shift. We 
were unable, however, to identify a specific point in time when this 
shift might have occurred, consistent with Inglehart's claim (p. 4) that 
such shifts are gradual.7 This finding is also consistent with the 
empirical evidence showing that religiosity increases with age even 
when controlling for time periods and cohort effects (Hout and 
Greeley, 1987, p. 328, as cited in Iannaccone, p. 1474).  
C. Sub-Denominations Liberal to Conservatism 
Classifications 
The lack of uniformity in the results across denominations 
reveals the importance of disaggregating the major denominations and 
the failure to do so is likely the reason that related studies that 
aggregate denominations do not find religion to be important.8 In 
order to better understand how religious affiliation relates to 
international-policy preferences, we classify denominations based on 
the NORC and RM classification schemes.  
 
Table 4 provides the results for the NORC system. In addition, 
cohorts groups are created for African Americans who are Baptists (55 
percent of African Americans in our sample are Baptist) and for African 
Americans who are not Baptist. The Hispanic variable is robust to the 
inclusion of religious affiliation controls so, given the small number of 
observations, we do not create cohort groups for Hispanics. The results 
in Table 4 indicate a differential effect among African Americans in that 
African-American Baptists are more likely to support restrictions on 
trade and non-Baptist African Americans are more likely to oppose 
international institutions having enforcement rights. The results in 
Table 4 also show that liberal Protestants, conservative Protestants, 
and “other” Protestants are more likely to support policies that restrict 
trade, and conservative Protestants, and “other” Protestants are more 
likely disagree with international institutions having enforcement 
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rights. Conservative Protestants are also more likely to agree with a 
nation acting unilaterally.  
 
The largest religious denominations in the United States (and in 
our sample) are Catholic, Southern Baptist, and United Methodist, 
respectively. Under the NORC system, United Methodists are 
categorized as liberal and Southern Baptists as conservative (whether 
or not the individual resides in the south). To determine if United 
Methodist is driving the liberal Protestant results and Southern Baptist 
the conservative Protestant results, we separate these denominations 
from their respective categories and retest each model. The results 
show clearly that the United Methodist denomination is driving the 
results on the trade: It is United Methodists that are more likely to 
support restrictions on trade, while the remaining liberal Protestant 
denominations are not statistically different from the base group. 
Southern Baptists, in contrast, are not driving the results for imports, 
but display differential effects relative to conservative Protestants 
across the other three models in that other conservative Protestants 
are more likely to disagree with granting enforcement rights to 
international institutions but Southern Baptists are not, while Southern 
Baptists are more likely to agree with unilateral policy actions and 
restricting levels of immigration. 
 
As an alternative to the NORC classification system, Table 5 
provides results for the RM classification system. One significant 
difference between the NORC and RM systems is that RM focuses on a 
regional dimension and allows us to test our third hypothesis. 
Specifically, Baptists are separated into two groups, Baptists, 
regardless of whether they are Southern Baptists, who reside in the 
South Region and all other Baptists. The reason for this separation is 
due to the strong fundamentalist and evangelical dominance of the 
region (Coreno, 2002). Another difference between the two systems is 
that the RM categories of Liberal and Moderate are based on the major 
denominations as opposed to sub-denominations. Hence, all 
Presbyterians are categorized as liberal and all Methodists and 
Lutherans are categorized as moderate even though when considering 
scales of orthodoxy and biblical inerrancy, some sub-denominations 
within both are considered conservative Protestants and others liberal. 
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Results for the RM system differ from the NORC system in that 
moderate Protestants are significant in the imports model whereas 
liberal Protestants are not, and conservative Protestants are not 
significant in the institutions model. Disaggregating the major 
denominations or separating out Southern Baptists and United 
Methodists would simply lead us to the results found with the NORC 
system in Table 4, resolving the differences just mentioned.9 Instead, 
the second set of regressions in Table 5 increases the regional 
dimension of the analysis by separating Methodists and other 
Protestants in non-south and south cohort groups as a proxy means of 
capturing conservative Protestants influences that dominate the south 
region.  
 
The results show that Methodists are driving the results for 
moderates on the trade question but standard hypothesis tests 
indicate that there is no statistical difference between non-south and 
south Methodists. In contrast there is evidence of a statistically 
significant difference between south Methodists and non-south 
Methodists, with the former more likely to favor policies reducing 
immigration. Differences also exist between non-south Baptists and 
south Baptists, with the latter more likely to favor restrictions on 
imports and unilateral policy actions. The remaining regional aspects 
are the difference between non-south and south, other Protestants 
with the former more likely to oppose the rights of international 
institutions and the latter more likely to support policies that restrict 
imports, and the difference between remaining moderate Protestants 
(after Methodists and non-south Baptists are removed) and Methodists 
and non‐south Baptists, as the remaining moderate Protestants are 
more likely to support the role of international institutions. Hence, the 
results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate evidence of both affiliation and 
regional effects. If the regional dimension does indeed proxy for a 
conservative dominance in the south, then again, in general, this 
supports the notion that conservative Protestant denominations, 
particularly those in the south, are more likely to display policy 
preferences that can be labeled as nationalistic-protectionist. 
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C. Simulations 
The magnitude of coefficients of ordered choice models are 
notoriously difficult to interpret. To better understand the relative 
impact of religious affiliation, we simulate the marginal effects of 
religious affiliation for the second set of regressions of the NORC 
classification system in Table 4 (along the lines suggested in King et 
al., 2000). To do so, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted using 
Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results 
(Tomz et al., 2001). The process involves drawing 1,000 simulated 
parameters from an asymptotic sampling distribution that is 
multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the vector of 
parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance 
matrix of estimates. Next the simulated parameters are used to 
calculate two sets of probabilities. First, all explanatory variables are 
set at their mean value, except for the religious affiliation variables 
that are set at zero. In other words, every individual in all five imputed 
data sets is treated as if they have no religious affiliation. From this we 
generate the predicted probability of response to each category of the 
survey question. Next, we change every individual's affiliation to, say, 
United Methodist, and repeat the simulation generating new predicted 
probabilities. The differences in these predicted probabilities—the 
marginal effects—are illustrated in Figures 2 3 4 through 5.10 To better 
illustrate the relative importance of religious affiliation, we also include 
education (for models 1, 2, and 4) and political ideology (for model 3) 
as benchmarks. With respect to education we set all variables to their 
mean value and all affiliation variables to zero (a mean-value 
nonbeliever). We then increase education by one standard deviation, 
from approximately 13 years to 16 years of education, and simulate 
the new probabilities. The same process is used for political ideology, 
moving the individual from approximately 2.9, or “center,” to 3.9, or 
“right.”  
 
Figure 2 shows the change in probabilities for the question on 
restricting imports to the United States. The shift from left to right that 
occurs moving up the vertical axis illustrates how an affiliation with a 
particular group increases the probability that an individual will agree 
with policies that restrict imports. The figure shows that the magnitude 
of effect is largest for African American Baptists (whereas non-Baptist 
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African American was not statistically different from the base group) as 
the probability that an individual agrees strongly that the U.S. should 
restrict imports increases by more than 15 percent and the probability 
they strongly disagree falls by more than 2 percent. The next largest 
shifts occur for Southern Baptists and United Methodists, respectively. 
For most response categories, affiliation effects are larger than three 
additional years of education. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of religious affiliation on 
preferences toward the enforcement rights of international institutions. 
Again there is a differential effect among African Americans. Non-
Baptists African American, labeled “other,” increases the probability 
that an individual will disagree strongly that international institutions 
should have enforcement rights by nearly 3 percent and reduces the 
probability that they will agree strongly by more than 10 percent. 
Other Protestant and Conservative Protestant are only slightly smaller 
in magnitude. These particular affiliation effects are greater than a 
shift in political ideology from centre to right.  
 
Figure 4 displays the effects of Southern Baptist and Jewish on 
preferences toward unilateral policy actions. As the figure shows, 
Southern Baptist has a slightly stronger effect than Jewish, increasing 
the probability by more than 9 percent that an individual will strongly 
agree, whereas Jewish increases the probability by more than 8 
percent. Both effects are relatively larger than the effect of three 
additional years of education. 
 
Figure 5 shows the impact of Southern Baptist on immigration 
preferences, in which Southern Baptist decreases the probability that 
an individual prefers increasing immigration a lot by nearly 2 percent 
and increases the probability that they prefer that immigration be 
reduced a lot by more than 14 percent. The affiliation effect is larger 
across all response categories than three additional years of education. 
Conclusion 
Rising church membership rates and the resurgence of 
evangelical Christianity have proved religion to be an important 
cultural force in the United States. In turn, there has been a renewal 
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of interest among political economists on the connection between 
religion and economic outcomes. In this paper we investigate the 
linkage between religious affiliation and individual international-policy 
preferences. Our results provide evidence of such a relationship in that 
conservative Protestants, particularly those in the south, are more 
likely to display anti-globalist views. That is, they are more likely to 
agree with polices that restrict imports, and reduce immigration, more 
likely to oppose granting enforcement rights to international 
institutions, and more likely to agree with unilateral policy actions. We 
also find differential affects of religious affiliation among African 
Americans as African American Baptists are more likely to support 
restrictions on imports than non-Baptist African Americans and the 
latter is more likely to oppose granting enforcement rights to 
international institutions than the former. 
 
Based on our results, we conclude that religion does matter and 
that the impact is far from uniform. It is our hope that this paper will 
motivate greater interest in the relationship between religion and 
international policy. We suggest that, when the 2003 ISSP survey is 
completed and compiled, future studies should extend both across 
time to detect possible shifts in cultural norms and cross-country 
differences. In addition, future research should also focus on the 
mechanism through which religious beliefs and religious participation 
affect international-policy preferences (perhaps along the lines posited 
by Montgomery, 1996) as well as the process by which these 
preferences move toward policy outcomes (such as Bearce, 2003). 
 
This paper benefited greatly from the comments of Marc von der Ruhr, 
Jim McGibany, Larry Iannaccone, Rob Toutkoushian, and two 
anonymous referees. 
Notes 
1 For data on religious organization and participation, see the American 
Religion Data Archive at Pennsylvania State University, 
www.thearda.com  
2 According to John Carr, chief legislative strategist for the Catholic Bishops' 
Conference, the debt relief program would not have materialized 
without the leadership of the religious community (Reichley, 2002). 
The efforts of Jubilee 2000 were most visible during the Denver G7 
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and Birmingham G8 summits, culminating in the Cologne initiative in 
1999. 
3 Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP. 
Neither the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any 
responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here. 
4 See Smith (1990) for a description of the process and the predictive power 
of these classifications. 
5 Scheve and Slaughter (2002a and 2003b) do not find region controls to be 
significant in regressions on import restrictions nor controls for 
“gateway communities” to be significant in regressions on immigration 
levels. Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003) deal with the collinearity of 
religious denominations and regional controls. They find that regional 
controls tend to capture the effects of a region's dominant religion and 
become insignificant when this is accounted for. Because the 
introduction of sub-denominations introduces this regional aspect, we 
avoid the direct use of regional controls in all of the models. 
6 The correlation coefficient between the two variables was approximately 20 
percent, which is statistically significant at less than the 1 percent 
level. 
7 We created different cohorts and tested each model three times with the 
various cohort dummies. The cohort groups are those born before 
1957 and after, before 1962 and after, and before 1967 and after. 
Regardless of how we modeled the break in age, none of the cohort 
dummies were statistically significant. 
8 Alesina and Ferrara (2002), for example, do not find religion to be a 
significant determinant of individual trust in others. Disaggregating of 
Protestant denominations may prove to be an interesting direction for 
that line of research. 
9 For example, separating out the Presbyterian denominations classified as 
conservative under the NORC system would render the category of 
liberal Protestants insignificant. 
10 The actual predicted probabilities, the standard errors, and 90 percent 
confidence intervals are available upon request. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Summary Data for Dependent Variables from Imputed Data 
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Table 2. Summary Description of Demographic, Economic, Ideology, 
and Religiosity Variables (mean of imputed data and use of the mean) 
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Table 3. Base Model/Major Denominations (p-values in 
parentheses.) 
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Table 4. NORC Classification System / Augmented NORC 
Classification System (p-values in parentheses.) 
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Table 5. RM Classification System / Augmented RM 
Classification System (p-values in parentheses.) 
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Figure 1. Distribution among Major Denominations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. U. S. Should Restrict Imports. 
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Figure 3. Institution Rights. 
 
Figure 4. Unilateral Actions. 
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Figure 5. Increase Immigration. 
 
 
 
 
 
